FREDERICKSBURG, VA. Fredericksburg, Va., Dec. 13, 1862. Army of the Potomac After the battle
of Antietam, on Sept. 17, both the Union and Confederate armies remained
inactive for nearly two months. Lee retired to Bunker Hill and Winchester,
Va., where he undertook the work of recruiting and reorganizing his
shattered army. McClellan was engaged during this time in guarding the line
of the Potomac, to prevent another attempt on the part of the Confederates
to move northward, and in reorganizing and equipping his forces. On Nov. 7,
he was relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac and Maj.- Gen.
Ambrose E. Burnside appointed to succeed him. One of, the first acts of the
new commander was to organize the army into three grand divisions. The
Right grand division, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, consisted of
the 2nd and 9th corps, the former commanded by Maj.-Gen. Darius N. Couch
and the latter by Brig.-Gen. Orlando B. Willcox, and the cavalry division
of two brigades, under the command of Brig.- Gen. Alfred Pleasonton. The
Center grand division was commanded by Maj.-Gen. Joseph Hooker and was made
up of the 3rd and 5th corps and the cavalry division of Brig.-Gen. W. W.
Averell. The 3rd corps was commanded by Brig.-Gen. George Stoneman and the
5th by Brig.-Gen. Daniel Butterfield. The Left grand division, commanded by
Maj.-Gen. William B. Franklin, consisted of the 1st corps, commanded by
Maj.-Gen. John F. Reynolds, the 6th corps, Maj.-Gen. William F. Smith, and
the cavalry division commanded by Brig.-Gen. George D. Bayard. With the
army were about 70 field batteries, the entire army numbering, according to
Burnside's report for Dec. 10, 116,683 men. Lee's army now numbered about
78,500 men and was divided into two corps. The 1st, commanded by
Lieut.-Gen. James Longstreet was composed of the divisions of McLaws,
Anderson, Pickett, Hood and Ransom, and the 2nd corps, under the command of
Lieut.-Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, consisted of the divisions of D. H. and A.
P. Hill, Ewell, and Jackson's old division, now commanded by Gen. W. B.
Taliaferro.
Burnside's plan was to establish a base of supplies on the Potomac, at
or near Acquia creek, and then move against Richmond by the way of
Fredericksburg. In telegraphing the president's acceptance of this plan
Gen. Halleck added: "He thinks it will succeed if you move rapidly;
otherwise not." This telegram was received by Burnside at his
headquarters at Warrenton, Va., a little while before noon on Nov. 14. The
war department promised to send a sufficient number of pontoons to
Fredericksburg to enable the army to cross the Rappahannock, and early on
the 15th, the army was put in motion for Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg,
Sumner's command forming the advance. Sumner reached Falmouth on the I7th,
and the rest of the army two days later. At that time there was only a
small Confederate force at Fredericksburg, and the intention was that
Sumner should cross the river and take possession of the heights back of
the town before Lee could reinforce the garrison. But the promised pontoons
had not arrived, the river could not be forded by a large army, and the
railroad and turnpike bridges had been destroyed by the enemy. There was
nothing to do but wait. Hooker and Sumner both wanted to cross the river at
some point above or below the town, but Burnside deemed it inexpedient to
hazard such a movement, until the entire army was ready. The pontoons did
not arrive until the 25th, and several days more elapsed before they could
be placed in position. Any one familiar with the military character of Lee
can readily imagine that he was not idle during this period. The day that
Sumner reached Falmouth the Federal plan was made apparent to the
Confederate commander, who immediately ordered McLaws' and Ransom's
divisions to Fredericksburg. On the 19th the rest of Longstreet's corps was
ordered up and on the 26th, Jackson, whose command was then in the vicinity
of Orange Court House, was directed to join Longstreet. The river for some
distance above and below the town was guarded by cavalry, D. H. Hill was
sent to Port Royal, a few miles further down, to prevent the Federal
gunboats from landing supplies there, and by the time that Burnside was
ready to cross Lee's whole force was intrenched on the heights in the rear
of Fredericksburg, his lines extending from about a mile and a half above
the town to the Richmond railroad below. In his report Burnside says:
"By this time (Nov. 25) the enemy had concentrated a large force on
the opposite side of the river, so that it became necessary to make
arrangements to cross in the face of a vigilant and formidable foe. These
arrangements were not completed until about Dec. 10.'
Fredericksburg lies on the right bank of the Rappahannock in a bend, the
general course of the river at this point being southeast. The heights on
the Fredericksburg side approach near the river at Beck's island, a short
distance above Falmouth, and extend in a semicircular form to the
Massaponax river, about 6 miles below the town. On the opposite bank are
the Stafford heights, running almost parallel with the stream, and at no
great distance from it. About a mile below Fredericksburg a little creek
called Deep run flows into the Rappahannock from the southwest, the widest
part of the valley being along this stream. Burnside had laid his plans to
cross the Rappahannock at a place called Skinker's neck, some 12 miles
below the town, but Lee became aware of his intentions and concentrated a
strong force in that neighborhood, thus forcing the Union general to change
his designs, almost at the beginning of the campaign. His reasons for this
change are besttold in the language of his official report: "I
discovered that the enemy had thrown a large portion of his force down the
river and elsewhere, thus weakening his defenses in front, and I thought I
also discovered that did not anticipate the crossing of our whole force at
Fredericksburg; and I hoped, by rapidly throwing the whole command over at
that place to separate, by a vigorous attack, the forces of the enemy on
the river below from the forces behind and on the crests in the rear of the
town, in which case we should fight him with great advantages in our
favor." To carry out this plan it was determined to throw two pontoon
bridges across the river near the Lacy house, at the upper end of the town,
one a short distance below the railroad bridge, and one or two about a mile
further down. On the night of Dec. 10, the pontoons were taken to the
designated places, and 147 pieces of artillery ranged along Stafford
heights to cover the crossing. About 4 a.m. on the 11th, work was commenced
on the bridges near the town and everything proceeded well until dawn, when
the pontoniers were driven from their work by a brisk fire from a body of
Confederate sharpshooters sheltered by a line of rifle-pits and concealed
in the houses along the river bank. About 6 o'clock work was resumed, but
again the men were forced to retire before the fire of the sharpshooters.
As early as Nov. 21, Gen. Sumner had notified the mayor of
Fredericksburg that the town would be shelled if the Confederates were
permitted to occupy it for military purposes, and after the second repulse
of the pontoniers the artillery was directed to open fire on the town.
Several batteries accordingly began shelling the houses that sheltered the
riflemen, and at the same time the 7th Mich. and 19th Mass. were sent over
in pontoons. Under cover of the artillery they charged up the bank and
chased the sharpshooters from their hiding places. The bridges were then
finished without further interruption and before dark Sumner's grand
division and part of Hooker's had crossed. Franklin met with no opposition
at the lower bridges and that evening the greater part of his grand
division was on the south side of the Rappahannock. On the 12th, all the
army was crossed over, with the exception of Stoneman's and Butterfield's
corps, which were held in a position to reinforce any part of the line that
might require assistance and to keep open the line of retreat in case it
became necessary to retire. From official reports and published accounts it
would seem that no definite plan of battle had been decided on until after
the troops were over the river. Burnside says: "By the night of the
12th, the troops were all in position, and I visited the different commands
with a view to determining as to future movements."
Near the south end of the ridge, on which the enemy was intrenched, a
road led from the old Richmond stage road and crossed the railroad at a
place known as Hamilton's crossing. From Fredericksburg the plank road ran
in a southwesterly direction to Orange Court House. Near the foot of the
heights the Telegraph road left the plank road and crossed the ridge
farther south. The Confederates had opened a road in the rear of the crest,
running from the Telegraph road to Hamilton's crossing, and further north
the canal ran along the foot of the ridge. The plan finally adopted was for
Franklin on the left to march down the Richmond road and seize the heights
near Hamilton's crossing; Sumner was to move out on the plank road to the
intersection of the Telegraph road, there divide his forces "with a
view to seizing the heights in the rear of the town;" Hooker was
ordered to place Butterfield's corps and Whipple's division of Stoneman's
in position to cross at the three upper bridges to support Sumner, and the
remaining divisions of Stoneman's corps at the lower bridge to cross over
and support Franklin.
At daylight on Saturday morning, Dec. 13, a dense fog hung in the
valley, completely concealing the movements of the two armies from each
other. Toward 10 o'clock this fog lifted and Franklin began his advance
Smith's corps formed the right, with Brooks' division on the right, Howe's
on the left and Newton's in reserve. Gibbon's division of Reynolds' corps
touched Howe's left, Meade's was formed at almost right angles to the main
line of battle and facing to the left. Confronting this part of the Union
line were the divisions of Ewell, (now commanded by Brig.-Gen. Jubal A.
Early) D. H. and A. P. Hill and Taliaferro, occupying the wooded slopes of
the hill, and Hood's division stretched across the Deep run valley west of
the railroad. D. H. Hill's division overlapped the Union left, and as soon
as Meade began to move against the Confederate lines he was met by an
artillery fire in front and on the left flank, compelling him to fall back.
Doubleday's division was thrown against the batteries on the flank and
gained some ground, but the artillery was well supported and could not be
dislodged. Three batteries were then ordered to Doubleday's support and
after a terrific fire of nearly an hour the Confederate guns were silenced.
Meade then opened a fierce artillery fire on the woods in his front, and as
this met with no response he pushed his line forward. It happened that his
advance struck a piece of boggy ground, which the enemy had deemed
impassable, and had caused a gap to be left in the line. Into this opening
the Union column now forced its way, sweeping back the enemy on the right
and left, and gaining the military road in the rear of the crest. Here part
of the second Confederate line was thrown into confusion, but part of
Gregg's brigade of A. P. Hill's division withstood the shock and held the
Federals in check until Early could come up with reinforcements. When Meade
made his rush he expected to be supported by Gibbon, but the latter was
delayed and Meade found himself almost surrounded by a force outnumbering
his own two to one. Hood hurried part of his command to that part of the
field, checking Gibbon as he came up. Pursuant to Burnside's order Franklin
had held the greater part of his grand division "in position for a
rapid advance down the Richmond road," so that the main body of his
forces was too far away to render assistance to those engaged. Finding
themselves unsupported Meade's men broke and fled in disorder, leaving a
large number of dead and wounded on the field and several hundred prisoners
in the hands of the enemy. Stoneman's corps had crossed the river, however,
and Birney's division was drawn up in the rear of Meade. The Confederates,
so intent upon the death or capture of the retreating Unionists, failed to
perceive this line and dashed up to within 50 yards of Birney's guns. Four
batteries opened with heavy charges of canister, fairly sweeping the
pursuers from their feet and causing their decimated ranks to beat a rapid
and disorderly retreat to the woods. This ended the operations on the left.
In the meantime a fiercer conflict was being waged on the Union right,
between Sumner and Longstreet. Shortly after 8 a.m. Willcox's corps was
ordered to the left to connect with Franklin's line, and to Couch was
committed the work of carrying the Confederate position at Marye's hill,
located between the plank and Telegraph roads and so called from the name
of the owner, who lived on the summit. Some idea of the strength of the
enemy's position here may be gained from the following extract from
Confederate Gen. Kershaw's report: "Marye's hill, covered with our
batteries, falls off abruptly toward Fredericksburg to a stone wall, which
forms a terrace on the side of the hill and the outer margin of the
Telegraph road, which winds along the foot of the hill. The road is about
25 feet wide, and is faced by a stone wall about 4 feet high on the city
side. The road having been cut out of the side of the hill, this last wall
in many places is not visible above the surface of the ground. * * * I
found, on my arrival, that Cobb's brigade, Col. McMillan commanding,
occupied our entire front, and my troops could only get into position by
doubling on them. This was accordingly done, and the formation along most
of the line during the engagement was consequently four deep."
Against this strongly fortified line, "four deep" the Union
troops were compelled to march nearly a mile across open ground, every foot
of which, except a narrow strip along the canal or mill race, could be
swept by the Confederate batteries on Marye's hill and the ridges to the
right and left. To make matters worse the canal could be crossed only at
two bridges, on one of which the floor had been torn up, so that the men
were compelled to cross in single file on the stringers. In the face of
these obstacles the attack on the hill was commenced about noon, French's
division forming the advance in columns by brigades, covered by a strong
line of skirmishers, and closely supported by Hancock. After crossing the
canal the lines were formed under shelter of the bank, on the strip of
ground referred to, and steadily moved forward until Kimball's brigade came
within short musket range of the wall, the enemy having been driven to
cover by the skirmishers. Hancock pushed forward Zook's brigade, which
joined Kimball's in the assault on the wall, but both were driven back with
severe losses, Kimball being wounded while leading the charge. Hancock then
sent in Meagher's and Caldwell's brigades, but with no better success.
In the forks of the road, about 15O yards from the wall, was a cluster
of houses, which formed a rallying point for the Union troops. About 1 p.m.
Couch ordered French and Hancock to carry the works by storm. Then, in
company with Gen. Howard, he climbed the tower of the court-house, from
which he could obtain a clear view of the field. Seeing that the works
could not be carried by direct assault, he ordered Howard to move his
division to the right of the Telegraph road in an effort to turn the
enemy's flank. Before the order could be carried out French and Hancock
called for reinforcements. Howard was recalled and sent to their
assistance. Willcox also sent Sturgis' division to the left of Hancock and
about 2 p.m. Butterfield's whole corps came on the field. Shortly after
this Hooker was ordered to "put in everything," Couch at the same
time being directed to "hold on until he comes in." By this time
the ammunition of several regiments of the 2nd corps was exhausted, the men
relying wholly upon the bayonet. About 4 o'clock word came that the
Confederates were retreating from the Marye house on the top of the hill,
and Humphrey's division was ordered in. Twice in quick succession he
charged against that impregnable stone wall, but each time was repulsed.
Getty's division of the 9th corps was next ordered to endeavor to break the
enemy's line on the left, near the unfinished railroad, but was met by a
heavy fire. Hazard's and Frank's batteries were ordered to his support, and
while they succeeded in checking the fire they were unable, even by a
vigorous shelling, to break the line. In fact, of all the assaults made
during the day none approached as near to the Confederate lines as did
Kimball and Zook in the first charge.
Thus the battle was waged, first at one point and then another until
dark, when the men were withdrawn and that night the main part of the army
bivouacked in the streets of Fredericksburg. On Sunday morning, the 14th,
the men began digging trenches along the edge of the town in anticipation
of anassault, but with the exception of some desultory firing at various
points along the line there were no hostile demonstrations. On Monday
Jackson and Franklin agreed upon a formal truce for the removal of the
wounded and the burial of the dead. Late that afternoon Burnside issued
orders for the whole army to recross the Rappahannock. Under cover of
darkness, in the midst of a cold rain storm, the defeated and dispirited
army crossed the river and the pontoons were withdrawn. The first battle of
Burnside's campaign had been fought and lost. The Union losses at
Fredericksburg were 1,284 killed, 9'600 wounded, and 1,769 missing. The
Confederate losses were reported as being 608 killed, 4,116 wounded and 653
missing. Many of the Federal dead were stripped of their clothing by the
enemy, the naked bodies being left exposed to the cold wintry winds and
rain. A woman who lived in one of the houses near the stone wall said
afterward: "The morning after the battle the field was blue; but the
morning after the Federals withdrew the field was white."
DEC. 13TH, 1862
Source: The Union Army, vol. 5